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98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1487 (2020)

THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL TAX LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA TAX CASES *
WILLIAM W. NELSON
[The taxing power], I contend, is manifestly a concurrent and coequal
authority in the United States and in the individual States.
—Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, No. 32. 1
In 2017, the Supreme Court of North Carolina rendered its decision in
Fidelity Bank v. North Carolina Department of Revenue. 2 The issue presented in
that case was whether the word “interest” as used in the North Carolina
Revenue Act 3 (the “Revenue Act”) should be construed in accordance with the
meaning given the term in the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”). The
court held that absent a “clear and specific reference” in the Revenue Act to
the Code’s definition of “interest,” that definition did not apply, and the term
must be construed in accordance with its plain meaning. 4
While the narrow issue in Fidelity Bank was the interpretation of a single
word, the case shines a revealing light on a large and important question: to
what extent do federal tax rules control the outcome of North Carolina tax
controversies? That question is important because taxpayers and the North
Carolina Department of Revenue (the “Department”) share an interest in
knowing what law governs a given case. More broadly, the answer to this
question has important consequences for the state’s ability to prevent the
erosion of its “concurrent and coequal authority” over the taxing power within
our federal system.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
The states’ taxing power is a core aspect of their sovereignty—one which
the ratification of the Constitution left essentially unimpaired. Indeed, the
Framers were eager to reassure the states on this issue. 5 The Constitution
* © 2020 William W. Nelson.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 156 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cary & McClellan eds., 2001).
2. 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (2017)
3. North Carolina’s Revenue Act is contained in Chapter 105 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-1 to 105-570 (2017 & Supp. 2019).
4. Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 20, 803 S.E.2d at 150.
5. As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 32:
[T]he individual states should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise
their own revenues for the support of their own wants . . . I affirm that (with the sole
exception of duties on imports or exports) they would retain that authority in the most
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does, of course, place some limits on state taxing power, such as the express
prohibition on state import and export duties. 6 Other limitations have been
applied through the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 7 the Supremacy
Clause 8 and the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 However, the most important
constitutional limitation on state taxing power is the Commerce Clause. 10 In
the mid-1960s, Congress entertained the idea of using the Commerce Clause
to impose uniformity on state corporate income tax laws. The states
vehemently opposed this effort as an affront to their sovereignty, and
Congress stayed its hand when the states took voluntary steps toward
uniformity on their own. 11 Since then, Congress has been hesitant to use the

absolute and unqualified sense; and that any attempt on the part of the national government
to abridge them in the exercise of it would be a violent assumption of power unwarranted by
any article or clause of the Constitution.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 1, at 154 (Alexander Hamilton). In a number of decisions
beginning in the Marshall era, the Supreme Court entrenched the Hamiltonian view into
constitutional law. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) (“The power of
taxation . . . is a power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by,
different authorities at the same time. We are accustomed to seeing it placed for different purposes,
in different hands . . . . This does not interfere with the power of the States to tax for the support of
their own governments; nor is the exercise of that power by the States an exercise of any portion of
the power that is granted to the United States.”); see also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S.
(18 Wall.) 5, 29 (1873) (“That the taxing power is one if its attributes of sovereignty; that it exists
independently of the Constitution of the United States, and underived from that instrument; and
that it may be exercised to an unlimited extent on all property, trades, business and avocations
existing or carried on within its territorial boundaries of the State, except so far as it has been
surrendered to the federal government either expressly or by necessary implication, are propositions
that have often been asserted by this Court. And in thus acknowledging the extent of the power to
tax belonging to the states, we have declared that it is indispensable to their continued existence.”).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
7. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948)
(striking down a shrimp boat license fee that discriminated against nonresident boat owners).
8. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819)
(applying the Supremacy Clause to hold that Maryland could not tax notes issued by the Bank of the
United States).
9. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 346 (1989)
(invalidating under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a property tax
regime that taxed recently sold parcels at much higher valuations than other parcels). Just this year
the Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to invalidate North Carolina’s
attempt to tax a foreign trust that had minimal connections to the state. See N.C. Dep’t of Revenue
v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2228 (2019). The Court has also
restricted the states’ ability to tax publications as an infringement of the First Amendment. See
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Com’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593 (1983).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-952, pt. 6, at 1143 (1964) [hereinafter Willis Commission Report].
Known as the “Willis Commission Report,” this report recommended “the enactment [by Congress]
of legislation providing a workable method of State income taxation of multistate business under
uniform rules governing division of income, jurisdiction to tax, and the basic definition of taxable
income.” Id. For the state response to the Willis Commission’s recommendations, see, for example, II
RICHARD D. POMP, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 10-04 to -05 (8th ed. 2015).
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Commerce Clause to regulate state taxation, limiting itself to a small number
of discrete prohibitions. 12
The Supreme Court has been more active in policing the bounds of state
taxing power through its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but it has
not used that doctrine to promote a “normative state and local tax regime.” 13
Indeed, the Court has recently loosened its Commerce Clause restrictions on
state taxing power out of respect for state sovereignty. 14 As a result, and
subject always to the possibility that Congress may one day more fully
exercise its positive Commerce Clause powers, state tax sovereignty remains
constitutionally robust. To this extent, at least, the Hamiltonian doctrine of
concurrent and coequal taxing authority is alive and well.
FORMAL LINKS BETWEEN THE STATE AND FEDERAL TAX SYSTEMS
Although state autonomy in tax matters may be constitutionally secure,
North Carolina has voluntarily ceded some of that autonomy to the federal
government.
The state’s Individual Income Tax 15 and the Corporation Income Tax 16
share a common tax base with their federal counterparts. The starting point
for computing North Carolina income is federal adjusted gross income (for
individuals) and federal taxable income (for corporations), both as determined
under the Code. 17 Adopting the federal tax base creates efficiencies for
taxpayers and the Department. Taxpayers are able to compute their income
for federal and state purposes under a single set of rules. The Department, by
requiring taxpayers to report changes to their federal returns resulting from a
federal audit, 18 can rely on the Internal Revenue Service to police the common
tax base.

12. See, e.g., Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. XI, 112 Stat. 2681-719
(1998) (amended 2007) (prohibiting state internet access taxes and discriminatory taxes on internet
transactions); Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (prohibiting states
from imposing income taxes on nonresident persons engaged in interstate commerce with minimal
contacts to the taxing state) .
13. William F. Fox & John A. Swain, The Federal Role in State Taxation: A Normative Approach,
60 NAT’L TAX J. 611, 619 (2007). For instance, while taxes on interstate actors must be fairly
apportioned, the Court has tolerated a wide variety of apportionment systems. See, e.g., Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280–81 (1978) (upholding single sales factor apportionment).
14. In last year’s decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018), the Court
described the judge-made rule that states could not impose sales tax collection obligations on remote
sellers without an in-state physical presence as “an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on
States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions.” Id. at 2086.
15. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-153.1 to -159 (2017).
16. See id. §§ 105-130 to -130.25. Income taxes are also imposed on trusts and estates. See id.
§§ 105-160 to -160.8.
17. Id. §§ 105-130.5, -153.4.
18. See id. §§ 105-130.20, -159.
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In addition to tax base conformity, North Carolina tends to borrow
specific rules and definitions from the Code. 19 The Code thus serves as a sort
of tax thesaurus for state legislative drafters. For instance, North Carolina has
special rules governing related-party royalty payments, which rely on Code
definitions and attribution rules to determine when two parties are related. 20
The Revenue Act also relies on more general aspects of the federal tax system.
For instance, in computing state net income, corporations are required to
employ tax accounting methods that “follow as nearly as practicable the
federal practice.” 21 Resorting to these federal rules can save time for legislative
drafters and provide efficiencies to taxpayers familiar with the federal
concepts.
These formal links between the federal and state income tax systems
have not appreciably diminished North Carolina’s autonomy in tax matters. In
addition to the income tax, North Carolina levies a variety of taxes that have
no direct federal counterpart. 22 These include the Franchise Tax, 23 the
Insurance Company Gross Premiums Tax, 24 and various privilege and excise
taxes. 25 In addition, the Sales and Use Tax, 26 which is the state’s second largest
tax in terms of revenue contributed to the General Fund, 27 and the Property
Tax, 28 which provides local governments with a major source of revenue, have
no federal counterparts. These taxes are generally administered without
reference to—and remain free from—the influence of federal tax law.
Even with respect to the income tax, state conformity to the federal tax
base has its limits. The North Carolina Constitution prohibits delegation of
the state’s taxing power. 29 The General Assembly thus is required annually to
review amendments made to the Code and pick and choose those to which it

19. The Revenue Act includes over one hundred specific references to the Code. See generally id.
§ 105.
20. See id. § 105-130.7A (referencing Code §§ 318, 1563(b)).
21. Id. § 105-130.15(a).
22. See generally id. §§ 105-1 to -270.
23. See id. §§ 105.114 to -129.
24. See id. §§ 105-228.3 to -228.10.
25. These include the various privilege taxes levied under Article 2 of Subchapter I of the
Revenue Act, the Tobacco Products Tax (Article 2A), the Alcoholic Beverage License and Excise
Taxes (Article 2B), the Unauthorized Substance Taxes (Article 2D), the Highway Use Tax (Article
5A), the Scrap Tire Disposal Tax (Article 5C), the Dry Cleaning Solvent Tax (Article 5D), the Piped
Natural Gas Tax (Article 5E), the Solid Waste Disposal Tax (Article 5G), the Severance Tax (Article
5I), and the Excise Tax on Conveyances (Article 8E).
26. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-164.1 to -164.44M (2017).
27. See N.C. DEPT. OF REVENUE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF NORTH CAROLINA TAXES
2018, at 11 (advance ed. 2018).
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-271 to -395.1.
29. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) (“The power of taxation . . . shall never be surrendered,
suspended, or contracted away.”)
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wishes to conform. 30 The annual review is more than a pro forma exercise.
The federal government’s willingness to borrow allows it to tolerate more
erosion of the tax base than the state can accept without raising rates. The
General Assembly therefore regularly “decouples” from base-eroding
measures such as the federal bonus depreciation and expensing regimes. 31
North Carolina has also changed the starting point for computing individual
state taxable income from federal taxable income to federal adjusted gross
income, thus ensuring the state’s control over the deductions and exemptions
available to individual taxpayers. 32
THE INFORMAL INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL TAX LAW
The federal influence on North Carolina’s tax law is not limited to the
common tax base and other formal links between the two systems. Federal tax
law also exerts an informal influence on state tax law. The Revenue Act and
the Code inevitably use a common vocabulary to describe or classify taxrelated concepts, such as “interest,” “dividends,” “partner,” and “lease.” In
addition, the state and federal income tax regimes must be applied to common
situations. For instance, under both state and federal systems it may be
necessary to determine whether the form of or label given to a particular
transaction by the taxpayer should be respected, whether a taxpayer is acting
in his own capacity or as an agent or conduit of another, or whether a
transaction or arrangement has economic substance.
Tax practitioners often tend to assume that, absent a specific statutory
directive, commonly used terms should be given the same meaning and that
the evaluation of a transaction or arrangement should yield similar results
under both tax regimes. As a result, tax lawyers and administrators tend to
apply federal tax concepts to state tax issues without much careful thought as
to whether the concepts have any basis in state law. 33
This tendency simply reflects the fact that state income tax laws are
drafted and administered against the background of the much more
thoroughly developed federal income tax system, including its vast regulatory,
sub-regulatory and judicial components. As one federal report noted as early
as 1964, because of its high rates and significance for all taxpayers, “the
Federal income tax has become such a universally experienced and highly
30. This is done by annually updating the definition of the term “Code” in section 105-228.90
of the Revenue Act.
31. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.5B, -153.6.
32. The limitation of the federal deduction for state and local taxes enacted as part of the 2017
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, while motivated by reasons unrelated to state tax sovereignty, also has served
to disentangle the state and federal tax systems. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 11597, 111 Stat. 2054 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
33. See generally Jeffrey C. Glickman & Clark R. Calhoun, The “States” of the Federal Common
Law Tax Doctrines, 61 TAX L. 1181 (2008).
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significant fact of business life that it has come to dominate the entire field of
income taxation.” 34
The informal influence of the federal tax system on state tax law is more
difficult to monitor or even observe than the formal influences. It therefore
has the potential to sew confusion and even to erode state tax sovereignty to a
degree that is not fully appreciated. Fidelity Bank illustrates how taxpayers can
be led astray by assuming state adherence to federal tax concepts.
FIDELITY BANK
The issue in Fidelity Bank was whether the term “interest” as used in
section 105-130.5(b)(1) of the Revenue Act should be interpreted to give the
term the same breadth it has under the Code. 35 The taxpayer, a corporation,
had purchased United States government bonds below their face value and
held them until maturity. For federal purposes, the amount by which the face
value of a debt instrument exceeds its purchase price is referred to as “market
discount” 36 and, with limited exceptions, is treated as interest. 37
The North Carolina Corporation Income Tax is imposed on a
corporation’s “State net income,” defined as the taxpayer’s “federal taxable
income as determined under the Code” with certain adjustments. 38 One
adjustment permits the subtraction of “interest” earned upon obligations of
the United States. 39
The taxpayer argued that its market discount income was interest and
that because the income was earned on U.S. government bonds, it could be
subtracted in computing sate net income. The taxpayer reasoned that because
North Carolina uses federal taxable income “as determined under the Code”
as the starting point for computing state net income, the General Assembly
must have intended that the term “interest” as used in the Revenue Act be
interpreted in accordance with the Code to include market discount income.
The Department made a strong argument that federal tax rules had no
role in resolving the issue:

34. Willis Commission Report, supra note 11, at 255.
35. Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 11, 16, 803 S.E.2d 142, 143, 147 (2017).
36. See I.R.C. § 1278(a)(2) (2012). This provision was added to the Code by the Tax Reform
Act of 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1803(a)(6), 100 Stat. 2085, 2793 (1986) (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 1278 (2012)). Before this amendment, any amount received by a bondholder at maturity
attributable to market discount was treated as capital gain. See generally DAVID C. GARLOCK ET AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS, ¶1101 (2019).
37. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(4) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 116-66).
38. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-130.2(15), -130.5 (2017 & Supp. 2019); Act of August 1, 2019,
ch. 187, § 1.(g) 2019-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 198, 202 (LexisNexis) (to be codified at N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 105-130.5(a)(30)).
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5(b)(1).
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The North Carolina General Assembly has never adopted the Code
wholesale . . . . The fundamental premise of Fidelity’s argument—that
the North Carolina Revenue Act generally adopts the federal Code’s
definitions—is incorrect. No provision of the Revenue Act incorporates
the federal Code for all purposes. Instead, the Revenue Act selectively
incorporates only certain provisions of the Code. 40
The Department argued that the taxpayer was grossly overreading the
reference to “federal taxable income as determined under the Code.” 41 That
reference, the Department argued, cannot be read to incorporate federal tax
principles for the purposes of interpreting the items to be subtracted from
federal taxable income in computing state net income. 42
The Department also pointed to the many places in the Revenue Act
where the legislature specifically adopted a Code definition. Under the
principle of expressio unius, the General Assembly’s failure to expressly adopt
the Code’s definition of “interest” must be viewed as intentional. 43
Finally, and most generally, the Department noted that “[t]he provision
of the federal Code on which Fidelity relies, by its terms, does not extend to
North Carolina law.” 44
Because the General Assembly had left the term “interest” undefined—
by failing either to incorporate the federal definition or to supply a definition
of its own, the Department argued that the case should be decided by applying
the normal rules of statutory construction. 45 Undefined terms used in the
Revenue Act “do not take on any specialized meaning they might have under
the Code.” 46 Rather, they must be interpreted in accordance with their
“ordinary meaning.” 47 The ordinary meaning of “interest,” according to the
Department, is limited to “periodic payments” and does not include lump-sum
amounts received at maturity. 48
The Supreme Court of North Carolina accepted the Department’s
arguments in full. Applying general rules of statutory construction, the court
found that the term “interest” is unambiguous and therefore must be given its
plain meaning. 49 In determining that the plain meaning of the term was

40. See Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 18–19, Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. 10, 803 S.E.2d 142 (Nos.
392A16, 393PA16).
41. Id.at 18–25.
42. Id. at 21–22.
43. Id. at 22–24.
44. Id. at 24.
45. See id. at 29.
46. Id. at 21.
47. Id. at 23.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Fid. Bank v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 370 N.C. 10, 18–19, 803 S.E.2d 142, 148–49 (2017).
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“periodic payments received by the holder of a bond,” 50 the court ignored a
large body of federal tax law and looked solely to state law precedents,
specifically, a decision from 1874 involving a creditor’s action against a surety
on a demand note providing for annual interest payments and a state statute
providing for the monthly accrual of interest on delayed payments to
contractors on public construction contracts. 51
The court found no evidence of a legislative intent to incorporate federal
tax concepts. Any decision to follow the federal definition “requires specific
support in the relevant statutory language.” 52 Specifically, “when the General
Assembly intends to adopt provisions or definitions from other sources of law
into a statute, it does so by ‘clear and specific reference.’” 53 The court found
no such reference to the Code’s “interest” definition. 54
The court was untroubled by the fact that its holding created an
inconsistency between the state and federal tax systems. “[T]he fact that
Market Discount Income is treated as interest for purposes of determining
federal taxable income does not . . . mean that Market Discount Income
should be treated as ‘interest’ for all purposes under the North Carolina
Revenue Act.” 55 There is also “nothing illogical,” the court reasoned, about
treating the term differently for federal and state tax purposes. 56
Fidelity Bank is thus important both for establishing the principle that
Code provisions are not incorporated into the Revenue Act absent a “clear and
specific” statutory reference and for construing terms used in the Revenue Act
by resorting to state law precedents without regard to the halo of federal tax
lore that may surround them.
To a federal tax lawyer, limiting interest to “periodic payments” is a
surprising result. For federal tax purposes, interest includes any amount
50. Id. at 20, 803 S.E.2d at 150. The court expressly adopted the Business Court’s conclusion
that the “plain meaning” of “interest” is periodic payments received by the holder of a bond. Id.
Neither the Business Court nor the Supreme Court of North Carolina cited a source for this
definition.
51. Id. (citing Knight v. Braswell, 70 N.C. 709, 711–12 (1874)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143134.1(a) (2017).
52. Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 21, 803 S.E.2d at 150.
53. Id. at 19, 803 S.E.2d at 149–50 (quoting Lutz Indus. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332,
340, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955)).
54. The court’s holding was not entirely novel. In In re North Carolina Inheritance Taxes, the
court observed in connection with the construction of the term “debts of the decedent” in North
Carolina’s former inheritance tax law that “[w]hile the federal [estate tax] provisions provide some
guidance, absent a clear indication of legislative intent to parallel federal law by use of identical
language or otherwise, we cannot accept federal law as controlling.” 303 N.C. 102, 107, 277 S.E.2d
403, 408 (1981). Fidelity Bank represents a refinement of this approach by refusing to consider the
Revenue Act’s use of the same term used in the Code as an indication of legislative intent to adopt
the Code’s definition of the term.
55. Fid. Bank, 370 N.C. at 21, 803 S.E.2d at 150.
56. Id.
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payable to a lender to compensate the lender for the use of its money,
regardless of when paid. 57 To reach its conclusion in Fidelity Bank, the court
had to ignore many years of federal income tax history.
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Old
Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, 58 which is strikingly analogous to Fidelity
Bank. The case concerned the federal income tax treatment of market
premium rather than market discount. 59 The taxpayer issued bonds at a
premium above their stated principal amount, reflecting an above-market
nominal interest rate payable on the bonds. 60 The taxpayer argued that the
“interest” it was entitled to deduct was the nominal interest paid on the
bonds. 61 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that the premium
should be amortized over the life of the bonds, effectively adjusting the
nominal interest rate downward and reducing the taxpayer’s interest
deductions. 62
The Court, in the same manner as the state supreme court in Fidelity
Bank, applied normal rules of statutory construction and the “known and
ordinary signification” of statutory terms. 63
In the ordinary affairs of life, no one stops for a refined analysis of the
nature of a premium, or considers that the periodic payment universally
called “interest” is in part something wholly distinct — that is, a return
of borrowed capital. It has remained for the theory of accounting to
point out this refinement. We cannot believe that Congress used the
word having in mind any concept other than the usual, ordinary, and
everyday meaning of the term, or that it was acquainted with the
accountants’ phrase “effective rate” of interest, and intended that as the
measure of the permitted deduction. 64
Any federal tax lawyer today would smile at such a quaint result. Indeed,
the result was effectively reversed by regulations issued in 1957. 65 In 1965, the
57. See Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940) (defining interest as “compensation for
the use or forbearance of money”); see also GARLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, at ¶1101. As this treatise
also points out, the federal rule treating all market discount as interest is also objectionable, since
market discount may reflect a decline in the issuer’s creditworthiness rather than a change in interest
rates. In such a case the discount may reflect the potential for collecting less than the full amount of
principal at maturity. Id.
58. 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id. at 559.
62. Id. at 555.
63. Id. at 560.
64. Id. at 560–61.
65. See T.D. 6272, 1957-2 C.B. 18, reprinted in 22 Fed. Reg. 9418 (Nov. 26, 1957) (codified as
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c) (1957)). The current rules requiring issuers to amortize bond premium as an
offset to their interest deductions are found in Treas. Reg. § 1.163-13 (1960).
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Supreme Court recanted, recognizing that original issue discount on a zero
coupon bond was interest rather than capital gain, and disavowing its
primitive statements in Old Colony by noting that “[t]he concept of discount or
premium as altering the effective rate of interest is not to be rejected as an
‘esoteric concept derived from subtle theoretic analysis.’” 66 These
developments have been described as a “process under which specific federal
tax law concepts have supplanted common law notions of what constitutes
interest for tax purposes.” 67
That the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 2017 found itself in the
same place the United States Supreme Court had occupied in 1932 and had
since abandoned by 1965 illustrates the degree to which federal tax law has
outpaced state tax law. More importantly, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina’s willingness to ignore decades of federal tax development
demonstrates the strength of its commitment to deciding state tax issues solely
by reference to state law.
THE SCOPE OF FIDELITY BANK
The Code, of course, is not the only source of federal tax law. It is
supplemented by a vast and ever-expanding library of tax regulations, revenue
rulings, revenue procedures, technical advice memoranda and other
administrative interpretations. If, under Fidelity Bank, the General Assembly
cannot be assumed to have incorporated the Code en bloc into the Revenue
Act, it should go without saying that none of this administrative matter has
any direct force in North Carolina tax law absent a “clear and specific”
statutory reference.
When states have wished to sanction reliance on federal administrative
tax law, they have typically done so by specific enactments. For instance, a
Colorado statute provides not only that any term used in the Colorado
revenue law shall have the same meaning “as when used in a comparable
manner in the internal revenue code” but also that:
[d]ue consideration shall be given in the interpretation of this article to
applicable sections of the internal revenue code in effect from time to
time and to federal rulings and regulations interpreting such sections if
66. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 61 (1965) (quoting Old Colony R.R. Co.,
284 U.S. at 561). Congress began the process of requiring deferred payments to be treated as interest
by enacting Code § 483 in 1964. See Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 224(a), 78 Stat. 19,
77 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 483 (2012)). Section 483 was supplemented by enactment of the
original issue discount rules in 1969, which were significantly amended in 1982 and 1984. See Tax
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 41–44, 98 Stat. 494, 531–59 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97248, § 231(a), 98 Stat. 324, 496 (repealed 1984); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 413(a), 83 Stat. 487, 609 (repealed 1984).
67. See GARLOCK ET AL., supra note 36, ¶101.02[A].

98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1487 (2020)

2020]

APPLYING FEDERAL TAX LAW IN NC

1497

such statute, rulings, and regulations do not conflict with the provisions
of this article. 68
The wisdom of such a wholesale incorporation of federal administrative
guidance, and even its legality under non-delegation principles, could be
debated. But—suffice it to say—it has no counterpart in North Carolina law. 69
The decisions of the United States Tax Court and the tax decisions of
the other federal courts are another important source of federal tax law.
Federal judicial decisions in tax matters may, among other things, supply
meaning to undefined terms, 70 reorder transactions, 71 or ignore transactions as
mere shams. 72 Some states have authorized the application of federal judicial
tax decisions to resolve state tax matters. 73 North Carolina has not. 74
If federal tax opinions are to be given effect in state tax matters, care
must be taken to identify which decisions are to be followed. Oregon, for
instance, has adopted rules for resolving conflicts between federal courts in
determining which federal decisions are to be applied in state cases. 75 Giving
effect to federal judicial decisions without specific rules of this sort necessarily
would lead to confusion. North Carolina’s lack of any rules for reconciling
inconsistent federal opinions is evidence that the legislature does not intend
them to have any application in state tax cases.
The lesson, then, of Fidelity Bank is that none of the Code, federal
administrative tax law, nor federal judicial tax decisions have any direct
68. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-103(11) (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.). Kentucky
and Maryland also specifically incorporate federal administrative tax rulings. See KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 141.050 (Westlaw through 2019 First Extraordinary Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN.
§ 10-107 (Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.).
69. North Carolina law does require the application of federal regulatory tax guidance in
discrete cases. For example, the Secretary of Revenue is required to apply “the standards contained in
the regulations adopted under section 482 of the Code” to determine whether transactions between
affiliates are at arm’s length. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5A(h) (2017).
70. See, e.g., Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941) (interpreting “trade or business”).
71. The locus classicus is Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, treating a stock purchase
followed by a liquidation as an asset purchase. 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). This case has been
superseded by the enactment of Code section 338. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 224, 96 Stat. 324, 485 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 338 (2012)).
72. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
73. Kentucky authorizes the use of “judicial interpretations of the federal income tax law,” KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.050, and Maryland provides that “[t]o the extent practicable, the
Comptroller shall apply . . . judicial interpretations of the federal income tax law to the
administration of the income tax laws of this State,” MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. § 10-107.
74. Rather than authorizing application of federal judicial tax doctrines, some states have
enacted their own broad anti-abuse doctrines into law. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62C,
§ 3A (Westlaw through 2019 legislation). North Carolina has enacted its own economic substance
doctrine for the limited purpose of determining whether corporations may be required to file a
combined return. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-130.5A(g).
75. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 314.011(3) (Westlaw through 2018 Special Sess. of the 79th
Legis. Assemb.).
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application to the resolution of state tax issues. 76 Any one or more of these
authorities, of course, may be incorporated into North Carolina law by a “clear
and specific” statutory reference; the reasoning behind them may certainly be
noticed by state courts deciding state cases; and the Department may adopt
similar guidance through rulemaking—all without giving the federal
authorities direct application. To apply federal authorities directly to state tax
matters would avoid the difficulty, but also the legitimacy, of actual
lawmaking. 77
AN UNLEARNED LESSON
An “Important Notice” issued by the Department in September 2018
shows that the lesson of Fidelity Bank has not yet been fully absorbed. 78

76. An exception could be justified with respect to the common tax base. The phrase “as
determined under the Code” can plausibly be read to require the application of federal administrative
and judicial interpretations of the Code provisions that govern the calculation of federal taxable
income (for corporations) or federal adjusted gross income (for individuals). Application of a separate
set of state-specific interpretive rules would defeat the purpose of the common tax base and would
therefore arguably be contrary to legislative intent. The Department generally relies on the Internal
Revenue Service audit process to police the common tax base. However, the Revenue Act does not
preclude the Department from making an assessment, or the taxpayer from seeking a refund, in the
absence of a federal determination. In these cases, the Department must apply federal Treasury
Regulations and other federal guidance on its own. See, e.g., In re Proposed Assessment of Corp. Income
Taxes for Tax Years Ended Dec. 31, 1989 and 1990 by the Sec’y of Revenue of N.C., 1997 N.C. Tax Lexis
48, No. 95-144 (N.C. Dep’t of Revenue Aug. 26, 1997) (claiming the ability to apply federal judicial
tax doctrines to independently redetermine a taxpayer’s federal taxable income). This circumstance
presents a separate issue. The Department’s interpretations of the “laws administered by the
Secretary [of Revenue]” are prima facie correct. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-264(a) (2017). But it must
be doubted whether the state’s adoption of the federal tax base makes the Secretary’s interpretations
of Code provisions prima facie correct. Taxpayers challenging an assessment or a refund denial based
on the Department’s independent interpretation of the Code should not be required to overcome a
presumption of correctness. See Martin v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 194 N.C. App.
716, 720, 670 S.E.2d 629, 632 (2009) (“A state agency’s interpretation of federal statutes” will not be
given “the deference afforded a federal agency’s interpretation of its own statutes.” (quoting GTE
South, Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d 733, 745 (4th Cir. 1999))).
77. Under the North Carolina Constitution, “[o]nly the General Assembly shall have the power
to classify property for taxation.” N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(2). This provision has been interpreted to
mean that the state’s taxing power must be exercised by the legislature. See, e.g., Hajoca Corp. v.
Clayton, 277 N.C. 560, 568, 178 S.E.2d 481, 486 (1971); De Loatch v. Beamon, 252 N.C. 754, 757,
114 S.E.2d 711, 713 (1960); Henderson Cty. v. Smyth, 216 N.C. 421, 5 S.E.2d 136, 137–38 (1939);
Person v. Bd. of State Tax Comm’rs, 184 N.C. 499, 502, 115 S.E. 336, 339 (1922). It could be argued
that an attempt by the Department, even through formal rulemaking, to incorporate federal judicial
decisions or administrative guidance would exceed its mandate to interpret state law and
unconstitutionally intrude into the legislative sphere.
78. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, IMPORTANT NOTICE: TAX CREDITS INVOLVING
PARTNERSHIPS
(2018),
https://files.nc.gov/ncdor/documents/files/tax_credits_important
_notice_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/27J7-WSKJ]. An “Important Notice” is a “nonbinding interpretive
statement within the delegated authority of an agency that merely define[s], interpret[s], or
explain[s] the meaning of a statute or rule.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-2(8a)c.
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The notice concerns partnerships engaging in activities giving rise to
North Carolina tax credits and passing those credits through to their partners
through partnership allocations. The notice discusses two situations in which,
according to the Department, an investor in such a partnership would not be
entitled to claim his allocable share of the credit generated by the
partnership. 79 The first is where the investor is not in fact a “bona fide
partner” in the partnership. 80 The second is where the investor, though a bona
fide partner, purchases the credit from the partnership through a “disguised
sale” rather than receiving it through a partnership allocation. 81
The Revenue Act does not include any rules under which a partner’s
status may be ignored as not being “bona fide” or treating purported
partnership allocations as “disguised sales.” Moreover, the North Carolina
courts have not developed a body of tax law on these issues, and the
Department has not addressed them through rulemaking.
There is, however, federal income tax law on both issues. The federal
courts have issued a number of decisions addressing an investor’s “bona fide”
partner status, 82 and Code § 707 and the Treasury Regulations issued
thereunder contain elaborate rules for treating certain transactions between
partners and partnerships as disguised sales. 83 The Revenue Act, however,
does not include any “clear and specific reference” either to Code § 707 or the
federal bona fide partner doctrine. Until North Carolina develops its own law
on these matters, by legislation, administrative rulemaking, litigation, or
enacting a clear and specific reference to the federal law, these concepts are
simply not a part of North Carolina law.
The Important Notice nevertheless attempts to incorporate these federal
rules into North Carolina law by turning Fidelity Bank on its head. The clear
doctrine of Fidelity Bank (and the argument the Department forcefully
advocated in that case) is that federal conformity is the exception and state
independence in tax matters is the rule. The Important Notice states the
opposite: “North Carolina generally follows the Code, subject to statutory
exceptions and definitional differences.” In other words, state adherence to
the Code is the rule absent a statutory exception. Based on this extraordinary
misreading of Fidelity Bank, the notice states that “section 707 of the Code and
the regulations thereunder” apply directly to determine whether a partner can

79. Id. at 1–2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425, 445 (3d Cir. 2012).
83. See generally I.R.C. § 707 (2012) (discussing transactions between a partner and the
partnership); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-3 (1992) (defining when transfer of property by a partner to a
partnership will be treated as a sale of property for tax purposes).
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claim a partnership-generated North Carolina tax credit. 84 The notice also
refers to Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, 85 a federal
judicial decision that applied Code § 707, and states that because it “is a
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the case is controlling for North
Carolina.” 86 Of course, Fourth Circuit decisions are controlling for the
resolution of federal tax issues for North Carolina residents, but there is no
authority for referring to such decisions as controlling for state tax purposes. 87
The notice goes on to refer to a federal income tax decision from the
Third Circuit 88 addressing the bona fide partner issue and advises taxpayers
that this decision is “relevant” in determining whether a partnership investor
may validly claim a North Carolina tax credit passed through from the
partnership. 89 The notice does not explain why the decision is “relevant” other
than as an interesting data point, or why it is any more “relevant” for North
Carolina tax law than the Tax Court decision it reversed, which for federal
purposes controls outside the Third Circuit. 90
That the Department issued this notice after successfully advocating the
contrary position in Fidelity Bank just one year before illustrates how easily
state tax administrators can lose sight of the independence of the law they
administer in the face of a federal system that “dominates the field.”
CONCLUSION
The Department’s 2018 Important Notice highlights the confusion that
continues to cloud the issue of when federal tax authorities may be applied to
resolve North Carolina tax cases. The complete resolution of the issue likely
will require additional judicial development or legislative action. While
Fidelity Bank therefore might not be the last word, it should awaken North
84. Before its repeal by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, § 708(b)(1)(B) of the Code provided for the
technical termination of a partnership if more than half of the partnership interests were sold or
exchanged in a twelve-month period. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97,
§ 13504(a), 111 Stat. 2054, 2142 (striking portions of I.R.C. § 708(b)). The Important Notice also states
that § 708(b)(1)(B), before its repeal, was “also applicable” for North Carolina tax purposes, and that
a partnership suffering a technical termination for federal purposes “would lose its allocable [state]
tax credits.” N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 78, at 2.
85. 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir. 2011).
86. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 78, at 2.
87. See supra at note 67 and accompanying text (noting a possible exception where the case is
relevant to the determination of the common tax base). It is also important to note that Fourth
Circuit precedent is not necessarily applicable to North Carolina taxpayers investing in a partnership
that has its principal place of business in another circuit, a subtlety that highlights the danger of the
direct application of federal precedent to state tax cases without clear ordering rules. See I.R.C.
§ 7482(b)(1)(E) (Supp. III 2015); Peat Oil & Gas Assocs. v. Comm’r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2259
(1993), aff’d sub nom. Ferguson v. Comm’r, 29 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1994).
88. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Comm’r, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir. 2012).
89. N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 78, at 2.
90. See Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aff’d 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
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Carolina tax lawyers from their dogmatic slumbers. As Justice Holmes said of
the common law, the federal tax law is not a “brooding omnipresence in the
sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be
identified.” 91 No matter how articulately or how loudly the federal tax law
speaks, in state tax matters it may persuade, but it does not command.

91. C.f. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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